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PETER VALLENTYNE 
ABSTRACT: Natural properties are those that carve reality at the joints. The notion of carving 
reality at the joints, however, is somewhat obscure. It is sometimes understood in terms of 
making for similarity, sometimes in terms of conferring causal powers, and sometimes in terms 
of  figuring in the laws of nature. I develop and assess an account of the third sort according to 
which carving reality at the joints is understood as having the right level of determinacy relative to 
nomic roles. The account has the attraction of involving only very weak metaphysical 
presuppositions, but it fails to capture several features that natural properties are presumed to have. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Some properties, it is often supposed, are natural or genuine (e.g., being an aardvark), and some 
are gimmicky or fishy (e.g., being an aardvark or a pencil). Natural properties are those that carve 
reality at the joints, whereas gimmicky ones are those that don’t. The notion of carving reality at 
the joints, however, is somewhat obscure, and can be understood in several different ways. I shall 
develop and assess an account of natural properties that understands reality’s joints to be 
determined by the laws of nature. The general idea of such an account is not new, but the 
development and assessment that I give is.  
Broadly speaking, there are three main accounts of carving reality at the joints. According 
to the similarity account, a property carves reality at the joints just in case it provides the basis for 
similarity judgements (e.g., for why a  brown dog is more similar to a white dog than to a brown 
cat).1 According to the causal powers account, a property carves reality at the joints just in case it 
confers causal powers (where, as explained below, this involves more than nomic connections). 
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According to the nomic role account, a property carves reality at the joints (roughly) just in case 
it has the appropriate level of determinacy relative to its nomic role (being neither too 
determinate nor too indeterminate relative to the sensitivities of the laws of nature). The 
similarity account, and the causal powers account, each presupposes a privileged set of properties 
(that ground similarity and causality respectively). Such a presupposition is viewed by many as 
metaphysically suspect. The nomic role account presupposes only the existence of properties and 
of laws of nature, and although this is not uncontroversial, it is much less controversial. 
The main strength of the nomic role account is the weakness of its presuppositions. But 
precisely because of this weakness, the nomic role account, we shall see, is not able to capture 
various features that natural properties are commonly supposed to have. Although I am quite 
skeptical of the presuppositions of the similarity and of the causal power accounts, I shall not 
argue against those views. It may be that such presuppositions are necessary to solve various 
philosophical problems. My goal in this paper is more modest. I shall simply develop and assess 
the nomic role account on its own terms. 
 
2. Background: Properties and Natural Properties 
Before developing a specific conception of carving reality at the joints, I shall first elaborate on 
the general notions of property and natural property.2 
 A property, in the sense intended here, is a non-linguistic entity that (in the broadest sense) 
is instantiable, or that has a negation that is instantiable, and for which metaphysically necessary 
coextension is a necessary condition for identity. Properties may be n-place, for any n, but for 
simplicity I shall normally write in terms of monadic properties and leave the generalization 
implicit. Properties are logically abundant: if X and Y are properties, then so are any logical 
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variations and combinations that yield something that is capable of instantiation or which has a 
negation that is instantiable (i.e., as long as there is at least one “open position”).  These variations 
and combinations include negation, disjunction, and conjunction, taking the converse of a relation, 
and partial quantification over a relation. Being-a-pencil-or-an-aardvark is, for example, a property. 
 Coarse-grained properties are properties for which metaphysically necessary coextension is 
necessary and sufficient for identity. Fine-grained properties are properties for which 
metaphysically necessary coextension is a necessary but insufficient condition for identity (e.g., 
having two feet is not the same fine-grained property as having two feet and being self-identical). 
For simplicity I shall focus solely on coarse-grained properties. I am skeptical that the laws of 
nature are sensitive to fine-grained properties in any non-derivative way, but if they are, the account 
I shall offer can be revised accordingly.3 
 Natural properties are properties that carve reality at the joints. Natural properties are 
generally presumed to be logically sparse in the sense that the set of natural properties is not closed 
under property-preserving logical operations. Being an aardvark or a dog, for example, may not be 
natural, even if being an aardvark , and being a dog, each are.4 
 On one conception of natural properties, they are understood as properties that are “wholly 
present as a non-spatio-temporal part” in whatever instantiates them.  These are often called 
universals in contemporary terminology. Many philosophers (myself included) are quite skeptical of 
the meaningfulness and applicability of the notion of a property being wholly present as a non-
spatio-temporal part in each of its instances, but I shall not here argue against the relevance of  the 
notion. It may be that the perfect sense can be made of the notion, and that only by positing 
universals can we adequately resolve various philosophical problems (discussed below). My goal is 
to articulate a conception of natural properties that makes no appeal to the notion of being wholly 
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present in instances, and to assess the adequacy of this conception. (The similarity and causal power 
accounts mentioned in the introduction are typically developed in terms of universals.) 
 
3. Nomic Roles 
I shall develop and defend the nomic role account of natural properties, according to which natural 
properties are those properties that carve reality at the joints, where this is understood roughly as 
having the right level of determinacy relative to their nomic role. The account presupposes that 
there are laws of nature (which need not be deterministic). 5 More specifically, it presupposes that 
there are laws of nature that rule out some, but not all, metaphysically possible states of affairs.  
States of affairs that are compatible with the laws of nature are nomologically possible, and those 
that are not are nomologically impossible.6 
 Because the purpose of the nomic role account is to identify which properties are natural by 
appealing to the laws of nature, it presupposes that the laws of nature can be identified without 
previously explicitly identifying which properties are natural.  I have offered such an account 
elsewhere, and won't go into details here.7  Some accounts of lawhood, however, presuppose the 
prior identification of natural properties, and then identify laws as certain sorts of relations among 
natural properties.  Although the nomic role account of natural properties is compatible with this 
general approach (although not necessarily with the details of any particular approach), the 
combination of the two will be circular and unenlightening.8 
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3.1 Three Conceptions of Nomic Role 
What, then, is a nomic role? More precisely, how are nomic roles to be understood for the 
purposes of giving an account of natural properties?  With respect to the notion of having the 
same nomic role, we should note three distinct accounts present in the literature: 
 
Nomological Equivalency: Two properties have the same nomic role just in case they are 
nomologically equivalent (i.e., such that it is nomologically necessary that whatever instantiates one 
instantiates the other).9 
 
Equipollency: Two properties have the same nomic role just in case they are (nomologically) 
equipollent (i.e., have the same nomic connections with antecedent, concurrent, and subsequent 
states).10 
 
Equipotency:  Two properties have the same nomic role just in case they are (nomologically) 
equipotent (i.e., have the same nomic implications concerning subsequent states).11 
 
 More will be said below about the notion of nomic equipollency, but the basic idea is that 
equipollent properties have the same nomic connections.  These include both nomic implications, 
that is, what follows nomically from the instantiation of  the property, and nomic enablers, that is 
what nomically leads, perhaps with a specified probability, to the possibility of the instantiation of 
the property. Thus, equipollency requires the same powers (to affect), susceptibilities (to be affected 
by), and covariances involving antecedent, concurrent, and subsequent conditions. Equipotency, on 
the other hand, only requires the same nomic powers to affect subsequent conditions. 
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 Nomological equivalency entails equipollency, which entails equipotency, but the reverse 
entailments do not hold. Two properties with the same nomic powers are equipotent, but they are 
not equipollent, if they can be acquired in different ways. Two incompatible properties can be 
equipollent (same causes, effects, etc.) but they cannot be nomologically equivalent, since 
incompatible properties are never coinstantiated. 
 The nomological equivalency account of nomic role is too fine-grained in that it wrongly 
holds that nomologically indistinguishable (i.e., equipollent) properties may not have the same 
nomic role. Suppose, for example, that the laws of nature treat having a temperature of 40 degrees 
Celsius exactly the same as having a temperature of 40 plus one trillionth degrees Celsius. 
(Suppose, for example, that this difference in temperature is below some quantum threshold below 
which differences make no difference nomologically.) Whenever it is nomologically possible for an 
object to acquire/maintain/lose one property, it is also nomologically possible for it to 
acquire/maintain/lose the other, and whatever probability is associated with one is also associated 
with the other. (Which property is realized in a particular case is nomically random.) Furthermore, 
the nomic implications of the one are identical with those of the other. As far as the laws of nature 
are concerned, the two are the same, but the nomological equivalency account of nomic role 
wrongly classifies these properties as having different nomic roles, since the two are never 
coinstantiated.12 
 The nomological equipotency account of nomic role, on the other hand, is too coarse-
grained in that it wrongly holds that properties with the same nomic powers, but which may be 
acquired in different ways, have the same nomic role. Now, sometimes, indeed perhaps most of the 
time, we are primarily concerned with the nomic powers of properties, and only secondarily with 
their nomically possible antecedents.  And so for some purposes we will certainly want to focus on 
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equipotency classes of properties.  But if we are interested in properties that carve reality at its 
nomic joints, that make all and only the distinctions that nature makes, then equipotency is too 
coarse-grained for a criterion of sameness of nomic role.  For nature does distinguish between 
equipotent properties with different nomic antecedents. It says that the possibility or probability of 
acquiring one is different from that of acquiring the other. Thus, the equipotency account must be 
rejected as the relevant conception of nomic role.  (Again, this is not to deny that for many purposes 
equipotency is of more interest to us than equipollency.) 
 Equipollency, on the other hand, is by definition sensitive to everything to which the laws of 
nature are sensitive. It is thus a plausible conception of nomic role. Because the equipollency 
account will be the basis for the account of natural properties, it will be useful to flesh this account 
out more before proceeding to the account of natural properties. 
 
3.2 Nomic Role vs. Causal Role 
Equipollency requires sameness of nomic implications and sameness of nomic enablers. Because 
the latter notion is expressible in terms of the former (Property A is a nomic enabler with 
probability p of property B just in case it is a nomic implication of A holding that B holds with 
probability p), we can focus for the moment just on the notion of nomic implication. There are at 
least three ways that the notion of nomic implication might be understood. At its broadest, a 
dated state of affairs B holding with probability p is a nomic implication of a dated state of 
affairs A just in case the laws of nature ensure that whenever A holds, B holds with probability p. 
There is no restriction on the temporal order of A and B. Thus, for example, even if the date of A 
is later than that of B, if it is a law of nature that the only way that A can arise is by B arising, 
then B is a nomic implication of A. Nomic implications (which may be probabilistic states of 
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affairs) are, on this construal, the nomically necessary conditions of something holding. 
Temporal considerations are relevant only to the extent that the laws of nature make them so. 
 On a narrower construal, nomic implications are restricted to states of affairs that occur 
after the specified one. This restricted conception of nomic implication captures what we can call 
nomic powers (to produce future events), but for the purpose of characterizing nomic roles it 
would be inappropriate to adopt this conception. For it risks ignoring connections that the laws of 
nature establish. Nomic implications on this construal do not capture any nomic synchronic 
covariance conditions, for example (e.g., that a certain temperature is nomologically equivalent 
to a certain mean kinetic energy). Of course nomic enablers on this construal may presumably 
capture the nomic covariance conditions, so there might be no problem in imposing the temporal 
constraint on the equipollency conception of nomic role. But there would be no advantage either, 
since a plausible account will capture all nomic connections—not just ones going in one 
temporal direction. 
 A related, but different, sort of restriction on the relevant conception of nomic implication 
is to restrict implications to causal implications, where these are not understood merely as future-
directed nomic implications as above, but as some special kind of nomic connection. The idea is 
that some properties confer causal powers, and some do not, and the only relevant connections 
are those involving these causal powers. For example, one might hold that (given specific 
background assumptions) traveling at 100 kilometers per hour confers certain causal powers, 
whereas the disjunction, traveling at 100 kilometers per hour or having once accelerated beyond 
the speed of light, does not confer causal powers—even though the two are (we believe) 
nomologically equivalent (since the second disjunct is nomologically impossible). 
9 
 This restricted conception of nomic implication leads to a restricted conception of nomic 
role.  Call it the causal role account. To get this account off the ground requires much stronger 
assumptions than the unrestricted conception of nomic role that we have been considering so far. 
For it requires the assumption that there are causal connections that are not capturable in terms of 
nomic implications. We can grant, of course, that we can distinguish between nomic connections 
that are between an event and future events (nomic powers as characterized above) and other 
sorts nomic connections (e.g. synchronic covariances), but the causal role account requires much 
more. For it claims that nomologically equivalent properties (such as A vs AvB, where B is 
nomologically impossible) do not always have the same causal powers. But nomological 
equivalent properties have identical nomic implications and enablers. 
 Those who believe in universals (properties that are wholly present in their instances) will 
have little difficulty in accounting for causal connections in this deep sense. For they will simply 
say that causal connections are nomic connections between universals. A universal may be 
nomologically equivalent with another property, but if the other property is not a universal, then 
it confers no causal powers. As indicated above, I am deeply skeptical of universals, and eschew 
positing them for the nomic role account I am exploring. It may be that we need to posit 
universals to solve various problems, and if so we will have good reason to deny that natural 
properties can be characterized solely in terms of the broad nomic role account. But in this paper 
we are exploring how much we can do without positing universals, and so this route is not open 
to us. 
 One could posit causal powers in the above deep sense without positing universals. One 
could hold that some properties (which need not be wholly present in their instances) have causal 
powers and some do not. One might hold this view on the grounds that the laws of nature do 
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more than establish nomic implications in the broad sense. The laws of nature, it might be 
claimed, also identify which properties have causal powers.13 Or one might agree that laws only 
establish nomic connections as characterized above, but hold that there is an independent fact 
about which properties have causal powers. Either way, this involves a metaphysically 
problematic assumption. For such accounts require much more than the mere assumption that 
there are laws of nature that establish nomic connections in the broad sense. Although I am 
skeptical that there are causal powers over and above nomic connections, I shall not argue that 
point here. I shall simply examine what sort of account of natural properties can be developed 
without a strong assumption of causal powers. 
 
3.3 Equipollency Refined 
The intuitive idea of the equipollency conception of nomic role is similar in spirit to the idea of a 
Ramsey sentence corresponding to a predicate. You take a sentence that is true exactly if all the 
laws of nature are true, replace all occurrences of predicates by predicate variables, and then 
quantify over the variables to get a sentence that asserts that there exist properties such that the 
open sentence is true. Nomic roles can be thought of as second order properties of properties: the 
properties of being such as to make the open sentence, partially quantified, true. 
 There are two problems with this account of nomic role. One is that it is relative to a 
particular language (and its primitive vocabulary in particular). The other is that it does not 
distinguish metaphysically (or conceptually) necessary connections (e.g., that weighing 2 
kilograms entails weighing more than 1 kilogram) from metaphysically contingent nomic 
connections (e.g., that the force of attraction between two objects varies directly with the product 
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of their masses and inversely with the square of the distance that separates them). For this reason 
I shall develop a closely related but different account. 
To start, let us suppose that the laws of nature are probabilistic. Let p be the conditional 
nomic probability function. For any dated two states of affairs, S and Q, p(S|Q) is the nomic 
probability that S will occur given that Q occurs. If the laws of nature are strongly holistic, the 
probability function may be undefined whenever the conditioning state of affairs (i.e., Q in p(S|Q)) 
is less than a total state of the world. If, however, the laws of nature have some local pockets of 
determinacy, then p(S|Q) may be defined even when Q is less than a total state of the world. The 
rough idea (assuming monadic properties for illustration) is that two properties, A and B, have the 
same nomic implications just in case, for any dated states of affairs S and Q, and any individual i 
and time t, p(S|A(i,t)&Q) equals p(S|B(i,t)&Q). (Throughout sameness of probabilities assignments 
is to be understood to be compatible with both being undefined, but not with only one being 
undefined.) And A and B have the same nomic enablers just in case, for any dated states of affairs S 
and Q, and any individual i and time t, p(S&A(i,t)|Q) equals p(S&B(i,t)|Q). 
There are two qualifications needed on this account. First, nomic probabilities may not 
capture all nomic connections. For example, the laws of nature might determine what is 
nomologically possible, but not determine any probabilities (nomic possibilities without nomic 
probabilities). Second, even if the laws of nature determine nomic probabilities, if probabilities are 
restricted to standard (non-infinitesimal) numbers, probability functions cannot represent certain 
cases of nomic possibility or necessity. For example, if there are an infinite number of equally 
probable possibilities, a standard probability function must assign a probability of zero (since any 
positive standard number would result in the probabilities summing to more than one). But this has 
the result that a nomic probability of zero does not ensure nomic impossibility and a nomic 
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probability of one does not ensure nomic necessity. Non-standard probability functions (which can 
have infinitesimal values) can handle this, but since they are somewhat controversial, some may be 
reluctant to recognize them. 
If there are nomic possibilities, but not nomic probabilities, or if nomic probabilities are 
required to be standard numbers, then nomic probability functions do not capture all nomic 
connections. The problem, however, is easy to rectify. For in this case we can simply appeal both to 
nomic conditional probability functions and to nomic conditional possibility functions, where a 
nomic conditional possibility function, ps, ps(S|Q) takes the value of 1 if it is nomically possible 
that S given Q, and takes the value 0 if S is nomically impossible given Q. For brevity, I shall focus 
solely on nomic probability functions, and leave the generalization to nomic possibility functions 
implicit. 
 The second qualification needed concerns the condition that two properties have the same 
nomic role only if they have the same nomic implications and the same nomic enablers. For in the 
broad sense these depend on nomic probabilities, which depend in part on metaphysical 
possibilities that have nothing specific to do with the laws of nature. For example, the nomic 
probability of A(i,t) given A(i,t) is one in all worlds in which there are nomic probabilities. If we 
require the same nomic probabilities in order to be equipollent, then no incompatible property can 
be equipollent (since it will have probability  of zero, given A(i,t)). But this would be overly 
restrictive. For there is no reason to exclude the possibility that the laws of nature might treat two 
incompatible properties exactly the same. The property of having a temperature of exactly 40 
degrees Celsius, might, for example, be nomically indistinguishable from having a temperature of 
40 plus one trillionth degrees Celsius. But given that the two are incompatible, they cannot have the 
same nomic probabilities.14 
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 In order to handle this problem, the requirement of sameness of  nomic implications and of 
enablers should be restricted to cases where the properties involved are metaphysically independent. 
More specifically, we shall say that two properties, A and B, are equipollent just in case for all 
individuals i, times t, and dated states of affairs Q and S, such that neither A(i,t)&Q, nor B(i,t)&Q), 
metaphysically entails S, or ~S:  
1) Sameness of nomic implications: p(S|A(i,t)&Q) = p(S|B(i,t)&Q), and  
2) Sameness of nomic enablers: p(A(i,t)&Q|S) = p(B(i,t)&Q)|S). 
 With this account equipollency, and thus of nomic role, we can now proceed to give an 
account of carving reality at its nomic joints. 
 
4. Carving reality at the Joints: Promiscuity, Finickiness, and Contingency 
a.  Overview 
The rough idea of the nomic role account of natural properties is that corresponding to each nomic 
role there is a property that is neither excessively indeterminate nor excessively determinate relative 
to that nomic role. Such properties carve reality at its nomic joints and are natural. 
 To help us focus our thoughts, let's consider a simple model in which the only particulars 
are points in space, and the only properties are temperatures.  To keep things simple, we'll ascribe 
temperatures to spatial points (as opposed to material objects), and  we'll suppose that time and 
space are each discrete, one dimensional, and Newtonian (non-relativistic).  We shall further 
assume (again for simplicity) that the laws of nature permit only temperatures greater than or equal 
to 1, and less than 4, degrees Celsius, and that the “next” temperature at a given location is 
determined by its current temperature.  For any integer n, let Tn be the property of having a 
temperature greater than or equal to n, and less than n+1, degrees Celsius. More specifically, let us 
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suppose that all and only the consequences of the conjunction of the following two conditions are 
laws of nature: 
 (1) everything has either T1, T2, or T3; and  
(2)  anything having T1 (T2, T3, respectively) at a given time has T2 (T3, T1, respectively) at the 
next time. 
 Consider now the property, T2vT4. This property doesn't carve reality at the joints because 
it is excessively indeterminate relative to the laws of nature in that there is a more determinate (i.e., 
logically stronger) property that is nomologically equivalent. In particular, because temperatures 
greater or equal to 4 degrees Celsius are nomologically impossible, T2vT4 is nomologically 
equivalent to T2 (given the laws of nature, T2vT4 is instantiated when and only when T2 is). Thus, 
because T4 is nomologically impossible, T2vT4 is excessively indeterminate, and fails to carve 
reality at the joints. 
 One way, then, that a property can fail to carve reality at the joints is by being excessively 
indeterminate, that is, by failing to rule out things that nature rules out (i.e., by being compatible 
with nomologically impossible properties). Let us call such properties promiscuous. More precisely, 
call a property promiscuous just in case some metaphysically more determinate (logically stronger) 
property is nomologically equivalent. Promiscuous properties fail to recognize nature's distinctions 
between which properties are nomologically possible and which are not. Thus, promiscuous 
properties are not natural, because they carve up the world more coarsely than nature does. 
 In the above example, we were dealing only with temperature properties, and so we only 
had to worry about ruling out nomologically impossible temperatures. But when there are many 
different kinds of properties—mass properties and velocity properties, for example—a pure mass 
property will always fail to rule out nomologically impossible pure velocity properties, since pure 
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mass properties entail nothing about velocities. For the moment let us suppose that properties are 
partitioned into “natural” families (e.g., mass properties, length properties, etc.), and understand 
non-promiscuity to require only that nomologically impossible properties in the same family be 
ruled out. Below I’ll question the plausibility of the assumption of natural partitions of properties, 
and discuss the implications if the assumption is dropped. Making the assumption temporarily will 
make it easier to present the basic account of carving reality at the joints. 
 Consider next the property, T#2.0, of having a temperature of exactly 2 degrees Celsius. 
T#2.0 is excessively determinate in that it is sensitive to features which the laws of nature ignore. 
For the laws of nature in this example are sensitive to what integral temperature interval is had, but 
not to the specific temperature in that interval. T#2.0 has exactly the same nomic implications and 
enablers as T#2.1 (i.e., having a temperature of exactly 2.1 degrees Celsius). Each nomically 
implies that the next temperature will be T3, and each has T1 as its sole nomic immediately 
preceding enabler. The two properties are nomically indistinguishable, and thus each is excessively 
determinate relative to their nomic role.15 
 A second way a property can fail to carve reality at the joints, then, is by being excessively 
determinate relative to its nomic role. Let us call such properties finicky.  More precisely, call a 
property finicky just in case some distinct non-promiscuous property has the same nomic role. 
Finicky properties are not natural, because they carve up the world more finely than nature does. 
Here too let us assume for the moment that properties are naturally partitioned into families, and 
that non-finickiness only requires that no distinct non-promiscuous property in the same family has 
the same nomic role. 16 We’ll return to this assumption below. 
 So far, then, we have identified non-promiscuity and non-finickiness as necessary conditions 
for carving reality at the joints (being natural).  A third and final way that a property can fail to 
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carve reality at the joints is by being nomologically non-contingent, that is, by being either 
nomologically impossible or nomologically necessary (i.e., being such that the laws of nature 
ensure either that nothing in the property's domain instantiates it or that everything therein does).  
Nomologically non-contingent properties (such as that of accelerating past the speed of light, and its 
negation) do not carve reality at the joints, since they make no distinctions among nomologically 
possible things.17 
 Here, then, is the nomic role account of carving reality at the joints: 
 
Nomic Joints: A property carves reality at its nomic joints just in case it is nomologically 
contingent, non-promiscuous, and non-finicky. 
 
 Thus, natural properties, on the nomic role account, have exactly the right level of 
determinacy relative to the laws of nature: they are sufficiently determinate so as to be logically 
incompatible with nomologically impossible features, and sufficiently indeterminate so as to be 
logically compatible with any nomologically irrelevant features. 
 An equivalent characterization of carving reality at its nomic joints is as follows: For any 
property there are a number of other properties that are nomologically equipollent. Some such 
equipollent properties may be nomologically equivalent, and some may not be. The totality of the 
laws of nature, that is, divides properties into equipollency classes, and subdivides these classes into 
nomological equivalence classes. For each equipollency class of nomologically contingent 
properties there is, on the nomic role account, at most one property that carves reality at its nomic 
joints, and it is identified as follows. 
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 For each nomological equivalence class within an equipollency class, take the conjunction 
of all the properties in the equivalence class.  This conjunction is the most determinate property of 
the nomological equivalence class.  It is the only member of the equivalence class that is non-
promiscuous. All the other properties in the equivalence class fail to rule out some features that 
nature rules out (since nature precludes their instantiation without the instantiation of the 
conjunction). 
 This yields exactly one non-promiscuous property for each nomological equivalence class 
within a given equipollency class. If there is more than one nomological equivalence class, then all 
the non-promiscuous properties are finicky (since they are each more determinate than necessary). 
Thus, none of the properties having that nomic role will be non-finicky. The disjunction of the 
selected non-promiscuous properties, however, is non-finicky. For, since the selected non-
promiscuous properties make up all the non-promiscuous properties having the specified nomic 
role, their disjunction abstracts from nomically irrelevant features. 18 
 Thus, carving reality at it nomic joints can be recast as follows: 
 
Nomic Joints (recast):  A property carves reality at its nomic joints just in case it is (1) 
nomologically contingent, and (2) it is identical with the disjunction of all conjunctions of all 
nomologically equivalent properties within a nomologically equipollent class. 
 
 This finishes the basic account of natural properties.  Natural properties are properties that 
carve up the world the way nature does.  They are neither excessively indeterminate (promiscuous), 
nor excessively determinate (finicky).  The conjunction of all nomologically equivalent properties 
yields a non-promiscuous property.  The disjunction of all equipollent such conjunctions yields a 
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non-finicky, non-promiscuous property.  That property, if nomologically contingent, carves reality 
at its nomic joints, and is thus natural on the nomic role account. 
 
5. Strengths of the Account 
How well does this account of natural properties capture the features that natural properties are 
supposed to have? 
 First, natural properties (like properties generally) are not linguistic entities.  Their existence 
does not depend on the existence of any natural language.  Furthermore, although all meaningful 
linguistic predicates of any natural language correspond to properties, not all correspond to natural 
properties—indeed almost none of them do, since almost all of them are either promiscuous, 
finicky, or non-contingent.  Nor is it true that all natural properties correspond to some linguistic 
predicate of some existing natural language, since lots of contingent, non-promiscuous, non-finicky 
properties may not be expressible in the vocabulary of any existing natural language. 
 Second, all and only those properties that carve reality at the joints in terms of (broad) 
nomic roles are natural properties.  No surprise here. Of course, as indicated above, the notion of 
carving reality at the joints is sometimes understood in a more restricted causal power sense, and 
sometimes in the non-nomic, metaphysical sense of making for similarity, and the nomic role 
account will be assessed negatively below in terms of these other understandings. 
 Third, in all worlds with substantial laws of nature (i.e., for which some metaphysical 
possibilities are nomologically impossible), natural properties are logically sparse relative to the 
class of properties: not all properties are natural properties.  In particular, none of the following 
kinds of properties is natural: (1) the metaphysically universal property (which is instantiated by 
everything; e.g., being self-identical); (2) the metaphysically null (or impossible) "property" (e.g., 
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being non-self-identical); (3) nomologically universal properties (which all nomologically possible 
things instantiate); and (4) nomologically null properties (which no nomologically possible things 
instantiates; e.g., accelerating past the speed of light).19 
  In addition, if the laws of nature are robust in a certain way, then the negations of natural 
properties are not natural.  The robustness assumption is that for (any given domain of individuals, 
and) any natural number n, there is some n-place property which is nomologically null (or 
impossible) in that the laws of nature ensure that it is never instantiated.  Given this assumption, for 
any given property either it or its negation is promiscuous, since either it or its negation will fail to 
rule out some nomologically null property of the same adicity.  Thus, if a given property is natural, 
its negation is not.20 
 Fourth, the set of all natural properties of a given world provides the basis for a complete 
nomic description of the world in the sense that nomic facts supervene nomologically on natural 
property facts.  This is so because non-natural properties are either nomically non-contingent, 
promiscuous, or finicky, and all such properties supervene on natural properties. Nomically non-
contingent properties are either nomically impossible or nomically necessary. The former are 
identical with the conjunction of any two incompatible natural properties, and the latter are identical 
with the disjunction of all natural properties. Finicky property facts are either not nomic facts (e.g., 
that some finicky property is instantiated) or are nomic implications of nomically contingent non-
finicky property facts (e.g., that some finicky property nomically might be instantiated given certain 
circumstances is a nomic implication of the fact that some less determinate non-finicky property 
nomically will be instantiated in those circumstances ). Finally, promiscuous, nomically contingent, 
non-finicky property facts are nomologically equivalent to non-promiscuous, nomically contingent, 
non-finicky facts (since their promiscuous aspects have, by definition, no nomological force). So, 
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the totality of natural properties provides the basis for a complete nomic description of the world. 
We shall see below, however, that natural properties do not provide the basis for a complete (nomic 
and non-nomic) description of the world, since non-nomic facts do not supervene on nomic facts. 
 Fifth, which properties are natural is not knowable a priori, but rather requires empirical 
investigation, and depends on what the laws of nature are.  Knowledge of which properties are 
natural, that is, requires knowledge of which properties are nomologically equivalent, and which are 
equipollent.  And that requires knowledge of what the laws of nature are, which is not knowable a 
priori.21  
 The nomic role account of natural properties, then, captures many of the features that natural 
properties (and universals) are often supposed to have.  There are, however, a number of features 
commonly ascribed to natural properties that the nomic role account fails to capture.  Let us 
consider some specific objections. 
 
6. Objections 
One objection to the nomic role account is that it implies that natural properties need not be 
instantiated—although they do need to be nomologically instantiable (i.e., such that the laws of 
nature allow them to be instantiated).  Although some authors (such as Armstrong 1978 and Lewis 
1986) hold that only instantiated properties are natural, other authors (e.g., Tooley 1977, p. 686;, 
Fales 1990, p. 216, 1993, pp. 134-35; and Mellor 1995, p. 201) recognize nomologically possible, 
but uninstantiated, natural properties.  These latter authors hold that such recognition is necessary in 
order to account for how laws of nature govern, not merely how existing things behave, but also, 
how things of various types would behave if they existed. The nomic role account of natural 
properties agrees. It's true, of course, that the belief in laws governing non-actuals creates some 
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epistemic problems for those adhering to some form of empiricism.  But this is a general problem 
for beliefs that go beyond the immediately observed, and I won't attempt to solve that one here.  
Suffice it to note that, although the nomic role account does depart from a common way of thinking 
about natural properties, there is reasonable disagreement on this issue, and so it doesn't depart from 
the common way (since there isn't one). 
 A second objection is that on the nomic role account which properties are natural depends 
on what the laws of nature are, which can vary from world to world.  For, which properties are 
natural depends on which properties are nomologically equivalent and which are equipollent, and 
that depends on what the laws of nature are.  Given that the laws of nature can vary from world to 
world, then so can the naturalness of properties.  Some may object that the naturalness of a property 
is not world-relative.22 
 In order to avoid this world-relativity of naturalness, one needs to deny either that the laws 
of nature differ in some worlds, or that the naturalness of properties depends on what the laws of 
nature are.  Neither denial is possible on the nomic role account.  For the nomic role account 
presupposes that in at least some worlds there are laws of nature that rule out some metaphysically 
possible states of affairs.  But if all worlds have the same laws, then any supposedly ruled out 
metaphysically possible state of affairs will not be realized in any metaphysically possible world 
(since it is ruled out in all, if in any), which is a contradiction.  So the nomic role account is 
committed to there being at least two possible worlds with distinct laws of nature. Although the 
assumption that the laws of nature can vary from world to world is not unanimously endorsed,23 it 
is almost unanimously endorsed.  And it is clearly endorsed by Armstrong and Tooley.  So, I won't 
bother to defend that assumption. 
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 The assumption that the laws of nature determine what properties are natural is, however, 
controversial. Some authors hold that natural properties, such as, say, that of having a mass of 
exactly 2 kilograms, are natural in every world in which they exist, and thus do not depend on what 
the laws are in those worlds. 24 This view is plausible, if carving reality at the joints is construed as 
that which makes for (genuine) similarity, but it is not plausible if it is construed in terms of nomic 
roles. The nomic role account is formally wedded to the laws of nature determining what properties 
are natural. 
 So, the nomic role account holds that the naturalness of a given property is world relative, 
and that goes against a (perhaps the) common view of natural properties. 
 A third objection is that on the nomic role account natural properties fail to be fundamental 
in the sense of providing a complete and non-redundant basis for the describing the world. As 
indicated in the previous section, the set of natural properties on this account provides the basis for 
a complete nomological description of the world (a description of all nomological connections). It 
fails, however, to provide a complete description of the world, because it does not provide basis for 
the description of non-nomic facts. Facts about which of two equipollent properties holds are not 
capturable in terms of natural properties on the nomic role account. For example, facts about which 
of two distinct equipollent mental state qualia holds is not so capturable. So natural properties fail 
to provide a basis for a complete description of the world.25 
 Furthermore, the set of natural properties includes some descriptive redundancies in the 
sense that some natural properties can be ignored without destroying the descriptive power of the 
set.26 This is because, as I will explain, some conjunctions and disjunctions of natural properties are 
also natural properties on the nomic role account.  Obviously, such conjunctions and disjunctions 
generate descriptive redundancy. 
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 On the nomic role account the disjunction of natural properties is natural as long as it is 
nomologically contingent. For disjunction preserves both non-promiscuity (since, if each disjunct is 
incompatible with nomologically impossible properties, so is the disjunction) and non-finickiness 
(since disjunctions are less determinate).27 Thus, if T1 and T2 are two distinct natural temperature 
properties, then so is T1vT2, as long as it is nomologically contingent. 
 Conjunctions of natural properties may also be natural on the nomic role account. A simple 
example of this is (T2vT3)&T2, where T2 and T3 are incompatible and each is natural, and T2vT3 
is nomological contingent (and thus natural as well).  This conjunction is, of course, simply T2.  
This is a cheap example in that one of the conjuncts entails the other. For a more interesting 
example of a conjunction of two natural properties also being natural, we need two natural 
properties addressing different issues, say temperature and barometric pressure. Suppose T2 and  P2 
are each natural. Then T2&P2 will also be, as long as T2 and P2 are nomologically compatible (so 
that T2&P2 is nomologically contingent), and no other non-promiscuous property is equipollent (so 
that T2&P2 is non-finicky).  (The non-promiscuousness of T2&P2 is guaranteed by the non-
promiscuousness of T2 and of P2.).28 
 So, the nomic role account allows that disjunctions and conjunctions of natural properties 
are sometimes natural, and thus the account fails to ensure that there is no descriptive redundancy in 
the set of natural properties. Some (e.g., Tooley 1977), but not all (e.g., Armstrong), deny that the 
conjunction of two distinct natural properties is ever a natural property.  And almost all authors on 
the subject deny that the disjunction of two distinct natural properties is natural.29 
 The issue here does not presuppose that properties have a privileged definition or a 
structure (as they do on the fine-grained account).  It does not presuppose, that is, that some 
properties are conjunctive, others disjunctive, and no property is both.  It can allow that any given 
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property is equivalent to some conjunction of properties, and to some disjunction of other 
properties .  The issue here is rather one of definability -- rather than privileged definition (or 
structure).  It concerns whether some natural properties are definable in terms of conjunctions, or 
disjunctions, of other natural properties . If some natural properties are definable in terms of 
others, then the set of natural properties includes some descriptive redundancy. 
 Now, if natural properties are construed as properties that make for similarity, or that 
provide causal powers, such descriptive redundancy is quite problematic. For then the naturalness 
of certain disjunctions (e.g., brown-and-a-dog-or-white-and-a cat) will create problems in certain 
similarity judgements (is the brown dog more similar to the white dog or to the white cat?). And the 
naturalness of certain disjunctions will create problems for accounts of causal powers (do the causal 
powers come from A, or from AvB?). But the nomic role account, makes no attempt to account for 
similarity judgements or causal powers, and thus redundancies are not a problem in these regards. 
 Still, the general view is that disjunctions of natural properties are not natural, and the nomic 
role fails to endorse this view. So clearly there will be some descriptive redundancy. But why 
should we think that nature identifies a minimal set of properties with no redundancies? Of course, 
as theorists, we are interested in eliminating redundancies, because doing so makes our lives easier 
(by reducing the number of things that we have to deal with).  But we should not confuse our very 
legitimate interests in non-redundant sets of properties with anything given by nature.  Nature is 
silent on this. 
 To make the general point more specific, let us suppose that having a mass of 2 kilograms, 
and having a mass of 4 kilograms are natural properties. On the nomic role account (given some 
uncontroversial assumptions), so are having a mass of between 2 and 4 kilograms, and having a 
mass of 2 or 4 kilograms.  One might say that surely nature doesn't pay attention to such properties 
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when it is "pushing things around".  But this is not so.  There are a lot of things in the world that 
will break if a mass of 2 or 4 kilograms is placed on them, which won't break if a mass of 1 
kilogram is placed on them.  Nature is sensitive to this property.  Of course, the more determinate 
the natural property is, the more determinate nature's treatment is, but that doesn't establish that the 
less determinate properties aren't recognized by nature. 
 Of course there are subsets of natural properties that contain no redundancies, and we can 
arbitrarily choose any one of them as our set of primitives.  But nature does not impose any 
particular choice upon us.  Suppose, for example, that the set of all natural properties is just {A, B, 
AvB, and A&B}.  We can arbitrarily select {A,B} as the privileged base, but as far as nature is 
concerned {A, AvB}, or {A, A&B} are equally eligible bases.  Each set is expressively complete 
relative to the set of natural properties.  Any natural property, that is, is equivalent to some logical 
combination (involving negation, conjunction, and/or disjunction) of elements in the privileged set. 
As far as nature is concerned each base is just as good. 
 On the nomic role account, then, there are no fundamental properties in the sense of there 
being a uniquely metaphysically privileged descriptively complete and  non-redundant set of 
properties. Even the similarity and causal power accounts of naturalness may face this problem. 
For, as Sider (1995) has argued, if there are no atomic properties (of similarity or causal powers), 
then there will have to be some redundancy (e.g., if, for any P, P is identical to Q&R for some Q 
and R, where Q and R each provide grounds for similarity or causal powers).30 
 A fourth objection to the nomic role account is that it gives no account of causal powers that 
goes beyond nomic powers. Nomic powers, recall, are the nomic implications concerning future 
state of affairs. If A is nomologically impossible, then for any property B, AvB, is nomologically 
equivalent to B, and they have the same nomic powers. But those who believe in causal powers 
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hold that at most one of them has causal powers. They hold that the other is just epiphenomenal. 
Now the nomic role account of natural properties holds that AvB is not natural, on the grounds that 
it is promiscuous, but it makes no claim that the real powers reside with B (or perhaps elsewhere). 
To see this more clearly, consider a second example. Suppose that T1 and T2 (two temperature 
properties, say) are each natural on the nomic role account, but not equipollent. Then T1vT2 is also 
natural, as long as it is nomically contingent. T1, and T1vT2, have different nomic powers (since 
they have different nomic implications for the future), but neither is taken to be the real source of 
nomic powers.31 
 So the nomic role account gives no account of causal powers. Although some will view this 
as a major defect, those who are suspicious of the very idea of causal powers (but not of nomic 
implications) will find this silence appropriate. 
 A fifth objection to the nomic role account is that it provides no account of making for 
similarity or for projectibility.  First of all, it allows that non-intrinsic properties (those the having of 
which is dependent on whether there are other objects in the world) can be natural. 32 For example, 
the property of having a mass of 5 kg or being within a mile of the something with a mass of 10 kg 
could be natural. For it has various nomic implications and enablers, could be nomically contingent, 
non-promiscuous, and non-finicky. But similarity, at least on the usual construals, is determined 
solely by intrinsic properties. Second, even the intrinsic natural properties on the nomic role 
account fail to provide a basis for similarity judgements. If Green and Blue are each natural 
properties, then so is Green-or-Blue as long as it is nomically contingent. (All three are intrinsic.) 
So, on the nomic role account there is no way of making greenness, but not greenness-or blueness, 
the basis for similarity judgements. 
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 It would indeed be nice to have a clear account of  the basis for similarity judgements, and 
the nomic role account of natural properties offers no help.33 Closely related to this point, natural 
properties on the nomic role account need not be projectible in the sense that historical regularities 
involving them may reasonably be expected to continue.  Grueness (e.g., green and first examined 
before year 2000 or blue and first examined on or after year 2000) might be a natural property on 
the nomic role account. Grueness has nomic connections.  It has, for example all the nomic 
implications common to both greenness and blueness. It is both contingent and non-promiscuous, 
and if the laws of nature are sensitive to greenness and blueness in a certain way, it will be non-
finicky as well.  So grueness may be a natural property. 
 We all want to deny honorific status to this detestable property and its dirty companions, but 
it's not clear that we may do so legitimately.  Of course, if there are universals, or at least 
objectively privileged properties that make for similarity, then a solution to the grueness problem is 
at hand. But, given that the existence of universals or such properties is controversial, the 
naturalness of grueness may need to be tolerated. 
 A sixth and final objection to the nomic role account is that the usual sorts of 
determinates—mass, temperature, and the like—are not natural properties, if properties are not 
naturally partitioned into families. In my discussion of promiscuity and finickiness I assumed, for 
simplicity, that properties are naturally partitioned into families (e.g., mass properties, velocity 
properties, etc.), and that the conditions for non-promiscuity and non-finickiness were relative to a 
property’s family. Promiscuity was defined as excessive indeterminacy relative to the family of 
which the property is a member. Thus, failure to rule out nomologically impossible velocities (if 
there are any) does not make a mass property promiscuous. It is only failure to rule out 
28 
nomologically impossible mass properties (if there are any) that makes a mass property 
promiscuous. 
 Without the assumption that properties are naturally partitioned into families, however, 
almost any property we consider will be promiscuous. For almost every property fails to rule out 
nomologically impossible features that it does not address. Having a particular mass does not, for 
example, rule out nomologically impossible velocities, if there are any. So, without the assumption 
of natural partitions, the nomic role account classifies almost every property we might consider as 
non-natural. 
 It is time to address the assumption that properties are “naturally” partitioned into families. 
One possibility is that properties are so partitioned and the partition is objective (mind-
independent). If that is the case, then no revision is needed to the account. I doubt, however, that 
properties come with tags identifying a unique issue which they are presumed to address.  Of 
course, for magnitudes (i.e., properties which ascribe numerical measures of some feature; e.g. 
temperature ascriptions) it seems that there is a uniquely relevant family of properties dealing with 
the same issue.  For a given temperature property, for example, the uniquely relevant family of 
properties seems to be the family of all temperatures properties.  But what reason do we have to 
suppose that this family is objectively given?  For although we would almost always fix upon that 
family as the relevant one, this is, it seems, something fixed by our interests, and not by the property 
itself.  There are an infinite number of ways of partitioning properties into families. The partition 
that places all and only temperature properties in the same family is just one partition among many. 
A different partition might have all mass-temperature properties in one family.  And so on. And 
when one considers non-magnitude properties (such as being a rock), the existence of a uniquely 
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privileged family of properties (other than the family of all properties) becomes much more 
dubious.34 
 Another possibility is that properties are so partitioned, but the partitions are imposed by our 
cognitive structure. Here too no revision is needed to the account, but it would need to be 
understood that the naturalness of properties was not a purely mind-independent matter. Even this 
possibility, however, seems doubtful. For although for some properties (e.g. magnitudes such as 
mass properties) may have natural cognitively determined families, this is doubtful for many 
properties. What is the cognitively natural family to which the property of being a rock belongs? 
 If I am wrong, and properties do come naturally partitioned into families, then the nomic 
role account of carving reality at the joints avoids the problem of judging a mass property non-
natural simply because it fails to rule out certain nomologically impossible velocity properties. If 
properties are not naturally partitioned into families, however, then the notions of promiscuity 
(excessive indeterminacy) and finickiness (excessive determinacy), and therefore naturalness, must 
be based on appeals to all properties and not merely to properties in the same family. (Alternatively, 
we could take the natural partition to be the trivial one of putting everything in the same family.) 
And so understood, most of the properties we typically pick out will fail to be natural, since they 
will be promiscuous (because they fail to rule out nomologically impossible features that they do 
not address). 
 If there is no natural (non-trivial) partition of properties into families, then we must accept 
that all the properties that we typically refer to are promiscuous, and that, of course, conflicts 
radically with the common view about what is natural. This implication is not particularly 
surprising. For the common view presupposes that properties are naturally partitioned into families. 
Once that assumption is rejected, our views about what is natural will need to be radically revised. 
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 Of course, we can always assess the naturalness relative to a specified family of properties. 
Having a certain mass may be natural relative to the family of mass properties, but not relative to 
the family of mass-velocity properties. But this doesn’t help much, since our interest is in a notion 
of naturalness that is non-relative, or perhaps relative to the partition fixed by our cognitive 
structures. 
 The lack of a natural partition of properties does not make the nomic role account of 
naturalness incoherent or empty. It still judges some properties to carve reality at the joints and thus 
to be natural. It’s just that these properties will be rather different from our usual sorts of properties. 
They will be limited to properties that are the nomological restriction of some property, where this 
is the most determinate nomologically equivalent property (i.e., the conjunction of it and all 
nomologically equivalent properties). If , for example, there are only mass and velocity properties, 
and the only nomologically possible pure mass and pure velocity properties are M1-M3, and V1-
V3, respectively, then the nomological restriction of M1 is M1& (V1vV2vV3), and the 
nomological restriction of V2 is V2&(M1vM2vM3). Only properties that are nomological 
restrictions of some property are non-promiscuous, and thus natural. Such properties are natural if 
they are also nomologically contingent and non-finicky. 
 So, if there is no natural partition of properties, then questions about whether a given 
property is natural are, on the nomic role account, best interpreted as questions about whether the 
nomological restriction of the property is natural. Although the failure to classify some of our 
“normal” properties as natural is a serious shortcoming of the nomic role account, the problem can 
be mitigated somewhat by appealing to questions about the naturalness of nomological restrictions. 
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7. Conclusion 
Natural properties carve reality at the joints, but in the literature there are at least three conceptions 
of carving reality at the joints: making for similarity, providing causal powers, and having the 
appropriate level of determinacy relative to the laws of  nature.  I have developed and assessed an 
account of naturalness of the last sort. I haven't argued against the other two conceptions, although I 
have expressed some doubts about the very strong presuppositions that they require. 
 On the nomic role account natural properties are nomologically contingent, non-
promiscuous, non-finicky properties. This account captures a significant number of, but not all, the 
features that natural properties (and universals) are presumed to have.  In particular, it ensures that 
natural properties are sparse, that which properties are natural is not knowable a priori, and that the 
totality of natural properties provide the basis for a complete nomological description of the world. 
 The nomic role account, however, does not even attempt to capture the mysterious notion 
being "wholly present in its instances as a non-spatio-temporal part".  And it has the following 
features to which some will object. It allows that some uninstantiated but nomologically 
instantiable properties, and that some disjunctions and some conjunctions of natural properties, are 
natural.  It does not ensure that the set of natural properties is descriptively complete or that it has 
no descriptive redundancy.  It does not provide an account of causal powers, similarity, or 
projectibility. Finally, on the nomic role account, the usual determinates (exactly specified masses, 
etc.) are not natural (although their nomological restrictions may be). 
 More generally, the nomic role account does not rise to David Lewis's challenge of new 
work for natural properties (and universals).  It does not provide new resources for accounts of 
similarity, for causality, for reference, or for projectibility.  For natural properties on the nomic role 
account are not additional laborers available to do new work.  They are rather laborers already on 
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staff (viz. properties).  The nomic role account of naturalness is simply a new and useful way of 
categorizing these laborers.  This categorization has the merit of distinguishing the promiscuous 
and the finicky from their more natural brethren.  But it adds nothing to the labor force. 
 Now, it may be that, in order to get some important work done (e.g., solving problems 
concerning reference, causation, projectibility, and similarity), we will need to posit more than 
properties and laws of nature. We may need to posit, for example, universals understood as 
properties that are wholly present as non-spatio-temporal parts in their instances. Although I am 
skeptical that this is so, I have done little in this paper to cast doubt on the existence of universals. I 
have merely explored an account of natural properties that makes no appeal to universals. 
 The nomic role account has the general merit of presupposing only realism about the laws 
of nature and about properties generally, and of making natural properties quite non-mysterious 
once those presuppositions are accepted.  The weakness of the presuppositions, of course, greatly 
limits the tasks that can be accomplished. The plausibility of the nomic role account thus depends 
on which of the tasks should be rejected as unachievable, which can be accomplished by other 
legitimate means, and which require stronger metaphysical assumptions about properties (e.g., that 
some make for similarity or confer causal powers). If stronger assumptions about properties are 
legitimate, then the nomic role account is inadequate. Without stronger assumptions, however, it 
would seem to be the best account of the carving reality at the joints, and thus of naturalness.35 
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 Notes 
 
1
 One of the best accounts of carving reality in terms of metaphysical similarity is Hirsch 1993. 
2
 Some of the most comprehensive recent works on properties and natural properties are 
Armstrong 1978 and 1989, Bacon 1995, Bealer 1989, Fales 1990, Hirsch 1993, Lewis 1983, 
Mellor 1995, and Oliver 1996. Many of the most important papers on properties have been 
collected in Mellor and Oliver, eds. 1997. In addition to the works cited below, see also Mellor 
1980, Sober 1982, Wilson 1982 and 1985, Nelson 1985, Bigelow and Pargetter 1990, Swoyer 
1987, 1993, and 1996, and Taylor 1993. 
3
 For enlightening discussion of fine-grained properties, see Lewis 1986b, pp. 55-59. 
4
 Note that natural properties (e.g., having a specified temperature on many accounts) are typically 
not natural kinds where these are understood so that each individual instantiates exactly one natural 
kind, or so that natural kinds are essential (necessarily had) by the individuals that instantiate them. 
5
 For simplicity, I will typically write as if the only laws of a world are the laws of nature of the 
sort that science studies.  In principle, however, the proposed account is compatible with there 
being other sorts of laws as well (e.g., moral).  Thus, strictly speaking, the account gives rise to a 
narrow account of naturalness (relative to scientific laws only) and a broad account (relative to 
all laws). 
6
 Here and below compatibility with the laws of nature should not be confused with the stronger 
notion of compatibility with the laws and some given state of affairs (e.g., initial state).  Being on 
some distant planet at time t is compatible with the laws nature, but it is not compatible with the 
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laws of nature and being on planet Earth at time t', if t and t' are too close together (given the 
maximum travel speed). 
7
 See Vallentyne 1988. A similar account (which differs in some important details) is given by 
McCall 1994 
8
 The first three, and possibly the fourth, of the following accounts presuppose the independent 
identification of natural properties : David Lewis 1983, Tooley 1977, Armstrong 1983, and 
Dretske 1977. 
9
 This is very roughly the view that Hilary Putnam once articulated (but only to set aside).  See 
Putnam 1970.  I mistakenly endorsed this view in a footnote of Vallentyne 1988. 
10
 For discussions relevant to the difference between equipollency and equipotency, see the 
contrast between causal properties and causal powers in Wilson 1992, and the contrast between 
powers and liabilities in ch. 5 of Madden and Harre 1995. Although much of Sydney 
Shoemaker's writing on natural properties appeals to equipotency, he recognizes the need for 
something like equipollency.  See, for example, Shoemaker 1980a (p.297), the note added in 
proof of Shoemaker 1980b, and Shoemaker 1988. Finally, those who hold that the identity of 
natural properties is specified by the Ramsey sentence of the correct complete theory of nature 
hold the equipollency conception (or something similar).  One clear proponent of this view is 
Mellor (1991, pp. 173-5, 181; 1995, pp. 192-196).  
11
 This is clearly the most common view.  It is implicit, for example, in the work of Armstrong 
(e.g., 1978, p. 43).  It is quite explicit in Shoemaker 1980a and 1980b, in Achinstein 1974, and in 
Swoyer 1982.  See also Fodor 1991, p. 5 and Fales 1990, p. 211. Although the language of these 
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authors is in terms of the equipotency view, I suspect that many of them would endorse the 
equipollency view, once the difference is pointed out. 
12
 One might wonder whether we could ever distinguish between equipollent properties. An 
example might be two distinct but equipollent mental state qualia. In any case, the point of my 
discussion does not require that equipollent properties be distinguishable by us. 
13
 Shoemaker (1980a, 1980b, and most explicitly in 1988) views natural properties as those that 
have causal powers (and not merely nomic connections in the broad sense), but he takes the 
naturalness of properties and nomic connections as primitive, and identifies causal connections as 
nomic connections between natural properties. For insightful discussion of accounts identifying 
natural properties on the basis of their causal connections versus their nomic connections, see 
Hirsch 1993 (pp. 61-65). 
14
 Here I am building upon the discussion by Fodor (1991) of the irrelevance of conceptual 
implications for the identification of casual powers. 
15
 Isn't there a difference in the sorts of thermometer readings that they lead to?  Not in the very 
simple model under consideration - since there are not any thermometer reading properties .  And 
even if there were thermometer reading properties, there might be nomological limits to the 
distinctions that thermometers and thermometer readers could register. 
16
 My appeal to non-promiscuity and non-finickiness is loosely related to Yablo’s (1992b) appeal 
to leaving out too many relevant factors or bringing in too many irrelevant ones. An important 
difference is that he is developing an account of causation whereas I am developing an account of 
nomic role. 
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17
 Actually, this restriction to nomologically contingent properties could be dropped with no 
significant effect.  It would simply mean that two additional properties would be classified as 
natural: the property of being nomologically possible, and the property of being nomologically 
impossible.  Assuming that there are some laws of nature, the property of being metaphysically 
possible would remain non-natural because it is promiscuous, and the property of being 
metaphysically impossible would remain non-natural because it is finicky.  
18
 The disjunction of all the non-promiscuous properties in an equipollency class is not itself a 
member of the equipollency class whenever there is more than one such member. For example, 
in the example, the disjunction of all the equipollent properties in T#1.0’s equipollency class, 
namely T1, is not a member of that class. This is because, although T1 has the same nomic 
implications as T#1.0, it does not have the same nomic enablers (since T1 follows T3 with nomic 
certainty, but T#1.0 does not). This is a reflection of the fact that collapsing irrelevant 
distinctions (as in the disjunction that is T1) does not necessarily preserve facts about nomic 
enablers. 
19
 Armstrong (1978) endorses each of these claims. 
20
 Note that if there are no laws of nature, then all properties are equipollent, there are no 
promiscuous properties, and all properties are finicky.  Thus, none is natural. 
21
 Again, Armstrong (1978) endorses this claim. 
22
 See, for example, Lewis 1986, pp. 60-61, and Hirsch 1993, p.63. 
23
 One dissenter is Swoyer 1982. 
24
 See, Armstrong 1983, pp. 139-40, and Lewis 1986a, p. 60, fn. 44. 
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25
 I am indebted to Michael Tooley for pointing this out and for the example. 
26
 Armstrong (1978, p. 117), Lewis (1983, p. 346; 1986, p. 60), and Oddie (1991, p. 21) each 
ascribe non-redundancy to natural properties. 
27
 One way of attempting to avoid holding that disjunctions of natural properties are ever natural 
is to deny that there are any laws involving disjunctions.  Both Owens (1989) and Seager (1991) 
present arguments for this denial by rightly pointing out that evidence (e.g., that a 6 was not 
rolled on a die) that confirms a hypothesis (e.g., that a 1 was rolled) need not confirm the 
disjunction of this hypothesis with another (e.g., that a 1 or a 6 was rolled).  They conclude that, 
since laws are the sorts of things that are confirmable by their instances, lawhood is not closed 
under entailment (and thus not all the logical consequences, such as weakenings with 
disjunctions, of laws are laws).  I reject this approach because I reject any epistemic conception 
of laws.  Laws are the regularities imposed by nature, and so the interesting epistemic point about 
confirmability is irrelevant to the question of what regularities are imposed. 
28
 Although some disjunctions and conjunctions of natural properties are natural, not all are.  
Cheap examples are where the disjunction is nomologically necessary, or the conjunction is 
nomologically impossible.  Examples can also be developed where the disjunction, or 
conjunction, of two natural properties is finicky, and thus non-natural. 
29
 Mellor (1993, pp. 179-181; 1995, pp. 197-199) denies that negations, conjunctions, and 
disjunctions of natural properties are natural. A closely related claim is the claim that 
determinables (as opposed to determinates) are not natural properties. This claim is rejected by 
Fales (1990, ch.9) and by Elder 1994. 
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30
 For related doubts about the existence of  a privileged set of descriptively non-redundant 
properties, see Dupre 1993, Yablo 1992, Elgin 1995, and Taylor 1993.  
31
 For further discussion of how “gimmicky” properties have nomic connections, see Shoemaker 
1988 (pp. 215-217) and Hirsch 1993 (pp. 61-65). 
32
 Giving an adequate account of intrinsicness is no easy task.  See, for example, Lewis 1986a 
(pp. 60-63), Lewis 1983, Sider 1996 and Vallentyne 1997. 
33
 See Hirsch 1993 (pp. 56-61) for a defense of an objective notion of similarity. 
34
 For more optimistic views, see Elder 1992, Swoyer 1987, and Mundy 1987. 
35
 Work on this paper was funded in part by fellowship grant from the American Council of 
Learned Societies. I’ve benefited from comments and criticisms from John Bacon, George 
Bealer, John Carroll, Crawford Elder, Tony Ellis, Gary Hardcastle, John Heil, Mark Hinchley, 
Brad Hooker, Hugh Mellor, Brian McPherson, Trenton Merricks, Eugene Mills, Graham Oddie, 
Alex Oliver, Jacob Pinnolis, Ted Sider, Chris Swoyer, Michael Tooley, Stephen Yablo, Robert 
Wilson, and several anonymous referees. 
